The video footage produced by the surveillance cameras is an important evidence to support criminal investigations. Video evidence can be sourced from public (trusted) as well as private (untrusted) surveillance systems. This raises the issue of establishing integrity and auditability for information provided by the untrusted video sources. In this paper, we focus on a airport ecosystem, where multiple entities with varying levels of trust are involved in producing and exchanging video surveillance information. We present a framework to ensure the data integrity of the stored videos, allowing authorities to validate whether video footage has not been tampered. Our proposal uses a lightweight blockchain technology to store the video metadata as blockchain transactions to support the validation of video integrity. The proposed framework also ensures video auditability and non-repudiation. Our evaluations show that the overhead introduced by employing the blockchain to create and query the transactions introduces a very minor latency of a few milliseconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
S URVEILLANCE cameras are increasingly being used for safety, security, traffic monitoring and law enforcement purposes. According to a recent report by tech site Compar-iTech 1 , the world's most surveilled city is Chongqing, China where close to 2.5 million public CCTV cameras are installed. The prevalence of these cameras is a result of advances in face recognition technologies and admissibility of the video footage as criminal evidence in court actions [1] , [2] , [3] .
In Australia, the New South Wales (NSW) Police, has voiced their support for widsepread deployment of surveillance cameras for reducing crimes in the state [4] . Beside the state owned public cameras, privately owned surveillance cameras are also deployed in different places such as homes, shops, malls and offices [5] to inhibit trespassers and reduce theft and shoplifting. These privately operated cameras are an important component of the surveillance ecosystem as often their footage evidence is critical in the crime investigation process [6] . However, the video streams of these privately owned cameras are stored privately and only made available to the law enforcement agencies on request. The latter have to rely on watermarking and time stamping provided by the device manufacturer for validating the stored video. There is no guarantee that the obtained video stream has not been digitally tampered with. The variability of these video sources hence raises issues of information trust, authenticity and integrity. This highlights the need for a technology solution that can provide proof of integrity for video surveillance information exchanged between devices operated by entities with different levels of trust. In this paper, we focus on one such representative environment, an airport ecosystem. An airport consists of several different video surveillance systems maintained and operated by different entities (airport management, federal police, transportation service providers, non-airline tenants, etc). Fig. 1 . Airport security zones Figure 1 presents a set of multiple security zones based on their trustworthiness, namely trusted, semi-trusted and untrusted zone, that typically exist in an airport. There are multiple security cameras deployed by trusted entities such as airport management, federal police, etc. Airport management controls cameras installed to monitor the passenger areas, tarmac, apron and baggage handling operations while the trusted zone managed by the department of homeland security/home affairs encompasses federal police, customs, and immigration etc. The untrusted zone is compromised of sources external to the airport, mostly controlled by different agencies, such as parking management, transport services operators (bus, train etc). Next, there is the semi-trusted zone consisting of entities located physically inside the airport such as service arXiv:1912.11044v1 [cs.CR] 23 Dec 2019 providers, non-airline tenants (duty free shops, restaurants etc). The notion of semi-trusted implies that these entities follow certain security standards specified by the airport authorities.
The requirement of information trust and integrity is all the more crucial in the airport environment, as the video surveillance is used by government agencies to ensure public safety and the evidence is critical to support counter-terrorism investigations [7] . Due to the nature of the critical operations, a mechanism is required to ensure trust in the data produced by multiple sources in different trust zones. In this paper, we explore the application of the blockchain technology to provide the essential trust through integrity, non-repudiation as well as auditability of video data in the airport environment.
Blockchain was initially proposed as a public ledger to maintain Bitcoin transactions. However, many changes have since been proposed in the blockchain structure, algorithms and data models to make it suitable for use in different application domains. These changes are required as the main blockchain instances, such as Bitcoin [8] , are focused on digital currency. To fit into the video surveillance at airport scenario, we require a lightweight blockchain framework that is suitable for the resource constrained IoT environment and introduces minimal latency in managing transactions. Out of the available IoT based blockchain solutions, we employed a framework called SpeedyChain [9] , based on its unique capability to allow appending multiple transactions in existing blocks as opposed to traditional blockchains that requires to combine transactions and thus create a block. In SpeedyChain each device has its own block, and all transactions from that device are stored in that block, thus considerably reducing the transaction processing time. This lightweight blockchain implementation runs at the gateway level and manages transactions received from different sources.
We take a systems based approach and implemented a prototype consisting of Raspberry Pi 3 devices streaming several video data feeds to multiple gateways running as virtual machines. Each gateway has an instance of Speedy-Chain implementation tailored to support video transaction management. We evaluated the suitability and effectiveness of SpeedyChain as a technology solution to handle video streams validation and integrity. Our evaluation results show the efficacy of the proposed solution in being scalable, and that it introduces negligible overhead as compared with traditional video streaming solutions that do not rely on a blockchain based solution. Additionally, we performed formal verification of the protocol employed in the framework to validate its correctness and reliability. We used Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) [10] for this purpose. This tool provides a proof of correctness for secrecy of data and protection against the replay attacks related to messages exchanged. The analyser assumes a Delov-Yao intruder model and proved the validation protocol (presented in Section III-D) as safe.
Our specific contributions in this paper are as follows:
• Propose a blockchain based framework to support verifiable video metadata management. • System implementation and evaluation using the Raspberry Pi 3 platform.
• Evaluation of the system's scalability and the overhead introduced. • Security verification of the video validation protocol The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents related works. In Section III, we provide the details of our proposed framework. The framework evaluation and results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper and outlines the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Current video forensics research aims to ensure the data authenticity and integrity using different techniques and technologies [11] , allowing the video (or part of it) to be used to support court cases. Focusing on video integrity, some of the evaluated methods rely on embedding watermarks and inserting statistical information in the video itself. Mathai et al. [12] propose a video forgery detection and localization method based on statistical moment features and normalized cross-correlation factor. The proposed video forgery detection is focused on detecting duplicated content in a video sequence using normalized cross-correlation. However, this solution does not provide any proof of video integrity itself. Panwar et al. [13] proposed a framework to provide sensor data attestation through cryptographic functions enforcing a logsealing mechanism and producing immutable proofs used for log verification. The framework ensures that sensor data and log-sealed information could be stored in an untrusted storage with the proposed attestation framework ensuring its integrity. However, this framework relies on a trusted mechanism such as Intel SGX to store the sealed information in a centralized manner.
Prior works [8] , [14] , [15] have demonstrated the applicability of blockchain technology in a broad range of domains including finance, identity management and IoT security. Among the various blockchain implementations Ethereum and Hyperledger are widely considered to be suitable for a variety of these applications. However, due to IoT specific characteristics such as hardware limitations, Ethereum blockchain is a poor fit as it generally uses the Proof of Work (PoW) consensus algorithm [14] . The Hyperledger implementation, presents limitation related to its scalability for IoT scenarios [15] .
Due to these concerns, several researchers have proposed blockchain tailored for dealing with IoT devices and their data. Dorri et al. [16] proposed an optimized lightweight scalable blockchain (LSB) for IoT aiming to handle security and privacy aspects. This implementation is promising, however, the transactions are distributed among blocks according to the mining process. Similarly, IOTA blockchain was defined to support IoT solutions by relying in the DAG data structure. However, it still requires a coordinator before the transactions are added to the DAG [17] .
The use of blockchain to improve the reliability of video evidence is explored in research by Kerr's et al. [18] . The authors propose a blockchain solution which uses a centralized master node responsible for creating the blocks. Due to relying on a master node, the blockchain does not require a consensus algorithm. After creation, the block is sent to the camera, which is responsible for creating and embedding a watermark consisting of a hash of the video streaming metadata. The blockchain technology is also applied by Jeong et al. [19] for mitigating the possibility of forgery of the video data. The authors proposed an architecture that encrypts and stores the video, creates a license within the blockchain, and exports the video to an external storage solution. The decryption key of the video is stored in a private database of the blockchain node, which is responsible for the key management and access control to the stored video. In comparison, our solution neither modifies the raw video stream (by embedding a watermark or by encryption) captured by the devices nor relies on any centralised master node.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe our proposed framework detailing its components and their roles. The framework relies on the blockchain technology, which ensures data integrity using a hash algorithm to compute transactions and blocks information. The framework provides auditability by maintaining all the transactions processed through the framework for future reference. In addition, the framework uses the PKI system by associating each device with its public key. Any information produced by a device and managed by the framework is thus fully accounted, providing non-repudiation; a device cannot deny being the originator of that data.
The proposed framework follows a three-layer architecture, as shown in Figure 2 . The entities present in the smart airport scenario (responsible for producing, managing and storing the video footage) are mapped to suitable layers. The surveillance cameras are deployed in the sensing layer. The gateways in the transportation layer manage the camera video streaming. This layer has more resources than the devices deployed in the sensing layer, hence is also responsible for maintaining the blockchain and providing the proof for video integrity. Finally, we have the storage layer where we can use any suitable storage system. For this work, we use Interplanetary File System Network (IPFS), a popular blockchain based storage solution, for storing the surveillance videos. The gateways deployed in the transportation layer ( Figure 2 ) are responsible for maintaining the blockchain instance. The blockchain is a distributed shared ledger, in which each gateway maintain a local copy of the whole chain. In this scenario, the gateway is responsible for computing the metadata (detailed in Section III-C) from the received video and create a transaction.
The gateways in our framework are envisaged to support multiple cameras, hence the deployed blockchain solution should be lightweight (memory and processing requirements) and capable of working in the IoT environment. Out of the available IoT based blockchain solutions, we employed a framework called SpeedyChain [9] , based on its unique data model that allows appending transactions in existing blocks thus considerably reducing the transaction processing time. Figure 3 presents the SpeedyChain data model and its components. Each block (B k ) is composed of two main sections, block header (BH k ), and block ledger (BL k ), where k is the block index. In this structure, each device (i) is mapped to a specific block based on its public key (NPK i ), which is stored in the block header. Each block is linked with its parent by computing the parent hash through a hash function represented as H as follows
The blockchain transactions (T) are nested under each block header. All the transactions produced from a specific device are stored in the block identified by its public key. Each transaction, is composed by previous transactions hash (HashT m-1 ), gateway (j) signature (SigG j ), sequence number (m), and information (Info t ). The information field in each SpeedyChain was initially proposed to be applied in smart cities, which is a more generic scenario when compared with an airport, hence several changes are required in the original framework to handle the video integrity mechanism.
B. Device bootstrap process
In our framework, each device (camera) is allocated a separate block (linked to the camera public key) in the blockchain, where all the transactions of that camera are maintained. The bootstrap process takes place when a new surveillance camera is connected to the network. Before the streaming can start, the camera needs to get authenticated with the gateway. The authentication process involves identifying whether there exists a camera block in the blockchain.
The block creation takes place when the gateway identify that there is no existing block in the blockchain containing the camera public key. The gateway requests the camera public key (N P K i ) to proceed with its block creation. Each camera is uniquely identified by its public key present in the block header (BH k ). Additionally, the block header is populated with the hash of the previous block header (HashBH k−1 ), its index k in the blockchain, the block expiration time (Exp k ), time when the block was create (T ime k ) and the access policy (P ol k ) applicable to the device.
Once the block is created, the gateways run the PBFT consensus protocol following the definition presented by Lunardi et al. [20] . Only after the consensus is reached, the block is inserted in the blockchain and the permissioned camera is allowed to start the video streaming. Figure 4 presents the process of creating a transaction from the surveillance camera. The solution is composed of three main roles mapped to different layers as shown in Figure 2 . At the sensing layer, each surveillance camera produces the video streaming which is transferred to the gateway. The gateways are responsible for receiving the video streaming, processing and forwarding it to the storage system. Initially, the gateway validates the video source, only accepting video produced from authenticated sources. In this context, as the blockchain framework is permissioned, only cameras that have an exiting block created in the blockchain are allowed to stream the video to the IPFS network.
C. Video integrity protocol
We explain the functionality of the gateways in several steps 
D. Video validation protocol
The validation process is triggered when any stored video is required for investigation. The framework should provide a means to prove that the retrieved video has not been tampered with and identify the specific camera that has produced the video. The querying process is initiated by an authorised entity called Validator (VL). The VL is responsible for querying the requested piece of video from the storage (ST) based on the time and location parameters, and the video metadata hash from the camera's transactions stored in the gateways (GW). When the corresponding transaction is found in the block ledger, the framework compares the retrieved video metadata hash with the stored transaction metadata hash HashV M m . Figure 5 presents an hypothetical scenario where multiple chunks of video are required to be validated. This typical scenario involves gathering video feed from different cameras, in a specific time duration, in order to follow the movement of a suspect. Assume that based on the given time duration in the query, the following video sequence is required to be validated (shown with an arrow in Figure 5) 1) Protocol verification: Protocol verification is performed to assess the security related to messages exchanged by the protocol. As our framework does not involve multi-protocol interactions and has very clear roles defined for the entities, we selected AVISPA [10] instead of employing a rules-based symbolic verifier such as Tamarin [21] . AVISPA tool uses High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) to describe the protocol security properties. It implements the Dolev-Yao intruder model, which assumes that an intruder can control the communication network.
The notation applied in the query protocol is presented as: The VL requests the video feed identified by AD m to ST, following the protocol described in steps 1 and 2. The AD m is encrypted with the Kvl -1 along with the VL and ST identities; additionally, the entire message is encrypted using ST's public key (Kst). The requested video is returned to the VL by ST . The protocol encrypts the V d using the Kst -1 , and the entire message is encrypted using Kvl. Once the video is received from the storage, the VL requests from GW the HashV M m , which represents the hash of the video metadata stored in the blockchain at the time of its creation (steps 3 and 4) . The GW requires the Sc i , which is the surveillance camera information. This information is sent from VL and is encrypted with the Kvl -1 along the parties entities. The entire message is encrypted using the Kgw. The GW data is sent to the VL encrypting the HahsV M m using the Kgw -1 .
Using the AVISPA tool, the protocol was evaluated, and the results show that the exchanged data integrity was not compromised. AVISPA result declared the protocol as safe, which means a man-in-the-middle attack is not possible. An intruder can retrieve the network traffic, however, due to the asymmetric key combination applied in the protocol, the intruder is not able to tamper the information exchanged.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We describe the performance evaluation of the proposed solution to test the scalability and measure the overheads introduced in creating, storing and managing these transactions in the blockchain. Additionally, we evaluate the time spent for the validation process i.e.,time spent in retrieving the stored video, calculating the hash of metadata and querying transactions stored in the blockchain for validation.
A. Experimental setup
The setup uses a video camera module connected to a Raspberry Pi 3 board acting as the surveillance camera. It was implemented as a multi-thread web service using the Flask framework in Python 2.7, allowing the video feed streaming to multiples clients. The SpeedyChain (implemented in Python 2.7.10) and the video streaming functions (using OpenCV 4.4.1) are deployed in gateways operating at the transportation layer.
We deployed four gateways, each running Linux Server Ubuntu 18.04 in a virtual machine with 2GB of RAM, 1 processor and 10GB of the disk.
The video produced by each camera is stored in the IPFS (version 0.4.21) configured to run in a private mode (which only allows connections from pre-defined clients). IPFS was deployed in two virtual machines running Linux Server Ubuntu 18.04, each VM with 4Gb of RAM, 2 processors and 20Gb of the disk. Figure 2 illustrates how the various solution elements are logically distributed while Figure 4 introduces the interaction among different components to produce the transactions.
B. Evaluation
In an airport scenario, a large number of surveillance cameras are in operation and each gateway has to handle multiple live streams from these cameras. The first experiment that we ran aims to evaluate the scalability of the framework when the number of cameras managed by each of the 4 gateways are increased from 1 to 32. The length of the video recorded at the gateway level was of 30 minutes, which was split in small video chunks each of duration 10 seconds to generate 180 transactions for each surveillance camera. This experiment measures the overheard created at a gateway, for assembly and creation of a new transaction containing the video metadata. The results shown are the average across the four gateways operating in different virtual machines. Figure 6 presents the results plotting the average processing time against varying number of cameras producing video streaming. The y-axis represents the average processing time to create a new transaction from the metadata information extracted from the video chunk and push it into the blockchain. The graph shows that the average processing time is almost constant when the number of cameras are increased to 8 per gateway, and higher processing times are observed when more than 16 cameras are introduced per gateway. The increase in the processing time beyond 8 cameras per gateway can be attributed to the limited hardware resources assigned to each of the virtual machine (1 processor and 2 GB of RAM) emulating an IoT gateway. The gateway was also running multiple OS processes to manage multiple connected cameras.
Please note that the processing time here includes all the 4 steps highlighted in the video record protocol (Section III-C). However, as compared with a traditional system with no integrity ensuring mechanism, the real penalty only involves the step 1, where we calculate the hash of the metadata. The stream is immediately pushed to the IPFS in step 2. Steps 3 and 4 can be considered offline in a way that they do not effect the overall latency of a real time monitoring system. Moreover, even in the worst case scenario where we have 32 cameras per gateway and we consider latency of all 4 steps, the total latency introduced is only about 8 milliseconds.
In the second set of experiments, we evaluated the time required for the gateways to update their local copy after receiving notification of a new transaction from one of its peer. This involves steps of validation and insertion of the new transaction in their local chain. In this scenario, we used four surveillance cameras connected to a single gateway. Each camera produced video streaming over a period of 12 hours. The gateway was responsible for creating a total of 4320 transactions per camera with the total transactions equal to 17280. Figure 7 presents the time taken by the gateway and shows that the time increases as more transactions are being added. Note that all transactions from a single camera are being added to the same block, and that SpeedyChain is utilising a linear linked list as the data structure for keeping track of the transactions. Hence, a transaction with a higher sequence numbers takes more time to be inserted in the block, explaining the observed behaviour in Figure 7 . The results also show some deviations as the gateway is running multiple processes at the same time, e.g., operating system functions, multiple cameras connections. In the worst case, the gateway takes less than 0.8 milliseconds to append 4 transactions in 4 different blocks at end position of 4320. The last set of experiment focus on the validation process covering the time to retrieve transactions from the blockchain and compare the metadata with the video stored in the IPFS. We highlight that in this evaluation the time to retrieve the video chunk from IPFS is not considered, as it depends on the the network latency and the performance of IPFS.
For this scenario, the block length was composed of 4320 transactions produced from the surveillance cameras. Figure 8 presents the time required to query transactions for different video chunks. The searched transactions are located in different positions in the block, varying from position 16 to 4096. The results show that the time to query a transaction depends on the position of the transaction in the block, presenting an exponential growth of the query time. The reason for this behaviour can again be ascribed to the use of linked list in the SpeedyChain implementation that incurs a search penalty based on the position of the searched transaction (sequential search) in the block. In the worst case when the searched transaction is stored at the end of a block, the total validation time is about 3.1 millisecond.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we employed a lightweight blockchain instance, to propose a framework that can provide integrity, auditability and non-repudiation security properties related to surveillance videos. We focused on the use case scenario of an airport where the surveillance videos from multiple sources can be combined to form evidence for criminal investigations. We have taken a systems based approach and developed a proof of concept by using Raspberry Pi acting as surveillance cameras, gateways implemented as virtual machines and IPFS as the storage solution. Performance evaluation results show that our framework introduces minimal latency in creating and validating transaction in the blockchain. This work has demonstrated the viability of blockchain technology to provide a trust building mechanism in stored video. Our system implementation also provides insight regarding the requirement for IoT gateway hardware to handle multiple surveillance cameras producing real time video streaming.
As future work, we plan to improve the performance of the proposed framework by using optimised algorithms for insertion and querying the transactions in a blockchain. Moreover, the current implementation only allocates a single block per device for storing all the transactions. As shown by the evaluation results, the performance degrades when a large number of transactions are inserted in a single block. For supporting continuous video streaming, we are exploring the use of multiple blocks per device in order to further reduce the transaction insertion and query time.
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